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Abstract—With the recent rise of cryptocurrencies, the secu-
rity and management of crypto-tokens have become critical. We
have witnessed many attacks on users, their software, or their
providers, which have resulted in significant financial losses. To
remedy these issues, many wallet solutions have been proposed
to store users’ crypto-tokens. However, these solutions often lack
either essential security features, usability, or do not allow users
to customize their spending rules.
In this paper, we propose SmartOTPs, a smart-contract
cryptocurrency wallet framework that gives a flexible, usable,
and secure way of managing crypto-tokens in a self-sovereign
(i.e., non-custodial) fashion. The proposed framework consists of
four components (i.e., a client, a private key hardware wallet,
a smart contract, and an authenticator) and provides 2-factor
authentication performed in two stages of interaction with the
blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is
the first one that utilizes one-time passwords (OTPs) in the
setting of the public blockchain. OTPs are aggregated by a
Merkle tree and hash chains in such a way that for every
authentication only a 16B-long OTP is transferred from the
authenticator to the client. Such a novel setting enables us to
make a fully air-gapped authenticator utilizing transcription of
mnemonic words, while additionally offering resilience against
quantum cryptanalysis. We have made a proof-of-concept basing
on the Ethereum platform. A cost analysis of our implementation
shows that the average cost of a transfer operation is comparable
to existing 2-factor authentication solutions using smart contracts
with multi-signatures.
In contrast to the previous version of our work [42], we change
the protocol to utilize a hardware wallet with a display, enabling
us to protect against the attacker that tampers with the client.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies are successful beyond all expectations.
Their amazing rise in the last decade has resulted in various
open and decentralized platforms that allow users to conduct
monetary transfers, write smart contracts used as financial
agreements, or participate in predictive markets. If success-
ful, cryptocurrencies promise to revolutionize many fields
and businesses. Cryptocurrencies introduce their own crypto-
tokens, which can be transferred in transactions authenticated
by private keys that belong to crypto-tokens owners. These
private keys are managed by wallet software that gives users
an interface to interact with the cryptocurrency. There are many
cases of stolen keys that were secured by various means [17],
[29], [20], [7]. Such cases have brought the attention of
the research community to the security issues related to key
management in cryptocurrencies [36], [39], [14]. According to
the previous work [36], [14], there are a few categories of key
management approaches in Bitcoin, also applicable to other
cryptocurrencies.
Password-protected wallets encrypt private keys with user-
selected passwords. Unfortunately, users often choose weak
passwords that can be brute-forced if stolen by malware [31];
optionally, such malware may use a keylogger for capturing
a passphrase [14], [66]. Another similar option is to use
password-derived wallets that generate keys based on a pro-
vided password. However, they also suffer from the possibility
of weak passwords [29]. Hardware wallets is a category that
promises the provision of better security by introducing devices
that enable only the signing of transactions, without revealing
the private keys stored on a device. However, these wallets
do not provide protection from an attacker with full access
to the device [36], and more importantly, wallets that do not
have a secure channel for informing the user about the details
of a transaction being signed (e.g., [49]) may be exploited by
malware targeting IPC mechanisms [16].
A popular option for storing private keys is to deposit
them at server-side hosted wallets (a.k.a., custodial wallets)
and currency-exchange services [23], [21], [52]. In contrast to
the previous categories, server-side hosted wallets imply trust
in a third party, which is a potential risk of such a solution. Due
to many cases of compromising server-side wallets [77], [67],
[68], [58], [7] or fraudulent currency-exchange operators [76],
client-side hosted wallets have started to proliferate. In such
wallets, the main functionality, including the storage of private
keys, has moved to the user’s browser or a local application
[51], [18], [22], [24], [43]. Hence, trust in the third party has
been reduced, but the users still depend on the third party’s
infrastructure.
To increase security of former categories of wallets, multi-
factor authentication is often used, which enables spending
crypto-tokens only when a number of secrets are used together.
However, we emphasize that different security implications
stem from the multi-factor authentication made against a
centralized party (e.g., using Google Authenticator) and against
the blockchain itself (see details in Section VIII). In the former,
an authentication factor is only as secure as is the centralized
party, while the latter provides stronger security that depends
on the assumption of an honest majority of consensus nodes
(i.e., miners) and security of cryptographic primitives used.
Wallets from split control category [36] provide multi-factor
authentication against the blockchain. This can be achieved
by threshold cryptography wallets [39], [61], multi-signature
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wallets [4], [34], [74], [28], and state-aware smart-contract
wallets [75], [72], [25] that are based on Turing-complete
smart contract blockchains. The last class of wallets is of
our concern, as spending rules and security features can be
encoded in a smart contract.
Although there exist several smart-contract wallets that are
using multi-factor authentication against the blockchain [75],
[25], to the best of our knowledge, none of them provide an
air-gapped authentication in the form of short OTPs similar to
Google Authenticator, which is the focus of our work.
Proposed Approach. In this paper, we propose SmartOTPs,
a framework for smart-contract cryptocurrency wallets. Our
framework provides 2-factor authentication (2FA) of a user
against data stored at the blockchain, and it is accomplished
by: 1) a client, 2) a private key hardware wallet, 3) a smart-
contract, and 4) an air-gapped authenticator; forming the same
number of components as present in other equivalent solu-
tions [75], [25]. To produce OTPs, the authenticator utilizes
hash-based cryptographic constructs, namely a pseudo-random
function, a Merkle tree, and hash chains. We propose a novel
combination of these elements that minimizes the amount of
data transferred from the authenticator device, which enables
us to implement the authenticator (i.e., the second factor) in
a fully air-gapped setting, not requiring a USB or another
connection. Our proposed solution belongs to the category
of state-aware smart contract wallets (see Section VIII), and
it provides protection against the attacker that possesses the
user’s private key or the user’s authenticator or the attacker
that tampers with the client.
Contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We show that standard 2FA methods against the
blockchain do not meet either the security or usability
requirements for an air-gapped setting (see Section III-B).
• We propose SmartOTPs, a smart-contract wallet frame-
work that provides 2-factor authentication against the
blockchain (see Section IV). Our approach utilizes OTPs
that are managed in a novel way, enabling us to make an
authenticator device fully air-gapped.
• To increase the number of OTPs, we resolve the time-
space trade-off at the client by combining hash chains
with Merkle trees in a novel setting (see Section IV-C).
• We implement and evaluate our approach (see Section V).
The provided smart contract is self-contained, but its
operation set can be extended by the community.
• We introduce and formalize the notion of k-factor authen-
tication against the blockchain and k-factor authentication
against the authentication factors (see Section VIII). Us-
ing these notions, we propose a classification of authen-
tication schemes, and we apply it to related work.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
We assume a generic cryptocurrency of which the blocks
of records are stored in an ever-growing public distributed
ledger called a blockchain, which is resistant by design against
modifications. In a blockchain, blocks are linked using a
cryptographic hash function, and each new block has to be
agreed upon by participants running a consensus protocol (i.e.,
miners). Each block may contain orders transferring crypto-
tokens, application codes written in a platform-supported lan-
guage, and the execution orders of such applications. These
application codes are referred to as smart contracts and can
encode arbitrary processing logic (e.g., agreements) written
in a supported language. Interactions between clients and the
cryptocurrency system are based on messages called trans-
actions, which can contain either orders transferring crypto-
tokens or calls of smart contract functions. All transactions
sent to a blockchain are validated by miners who maintain a
replicated state of the blockchain.
Merkle Tree. A Merkle tree is a data structure based on the
binary tree in which each leaf node contains a hash of a
single data block, while each non-leaf node contains a hash
of its concatenated children. A Merkle tree enables efficient
verification as to whether some data are associated with a leaf
node by comparing the expected root hash of a tree with the
one computed from a hash of the data in the query and the
remaining nodes required to reconstruct the root hash (i.e.,
proof or authentication path). The reconstruction of the root
hash has the logarithmic time complexity, which makes the
Merkle tree an efficient scheme for membership verification.
A. Notation
By the term operation we refer to an action with a smart-
contract wallet using SmartOTPs, which may involve, for
instance, a transfer of crypto-tokens or a change of daily
spending limits. Then, we use the term transfer for the
indication of transferring crypto-tokens. By {msg}U we denote
the message msg digitally signed by U, and by msg.σ we
refer to a signature; RO is the random oracle; h(.): stands
for a cryptographic hash function; hi(.) substitutes i-times
chained function h(.), e.g., h2(.) ≡ h(h(.)); ‖ is the string
concatenation; Fk(.) ≡ h(k ‖ .) denotes a pseudo-random
function that is parametrized by a secret seed k; % represents
modulo operation over integers; Σ.{KeyGen, V erify, Sign}
represents a signature scheme of the blockchain platform; and
SKU, PKU is the private/public key-pair of U, under Σ.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND DESIGN OPTIONS
The main goal of this work is to propose a cryptocurrency
wallet framework that provides a secure and usable way of
managing crypto-tokens. In particular, we aim to achieve:
Self-Sovereignty: is a critical property ensuring that the user
does not depend on the 3rd party’s infrastructure, and
it does not store the user’s secrets. Self-sovereign (i.e.,
non-custodial) wallets do not pose a single point of
failure in contrast to server-side (i.e., custodial) wallets,
which when compromised, resulted in huge financial loses
affecting thousands of users [77], [67], [68], [58], [7].
Security: as we have seen in the past, the insufficient security
level of some self-sovereign wallets has caused significant
financial losses for individuals and companies [17], [29],
[20], [65]. We argue that wallets should be designed
with security in mind, and, in particular, we point out
2FA solutions, which have successfully contributed to the
security of other environments [1], [69]. Our motivation
is to provide a cheap security extension of the hardware
wallets by using OTPs as the second factor (similar to
2
Google Authenticator). In the context of cryptocurrencies,
we emphasize that implementing OTPs may be challeng-
ing, as all blockchain data are public.
A. Threat Model
For a generic cryptocurrency described in Section II, we
assume an attacker whose goal is to conduct unauthorized
operations on the user’s behalf or render a smart contract wallet
unusable. The attacker is able to eavesdrop on the network
traffic as well as to participate in the underlying consensus
protocol. However, the attacker is unable to take over the
cryptocurrency platform nor to break the used cryptographic
primitives. We further assume that the attacker is able to inter-
cept and “override” the user’s transactions, e.g., by launching a
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack or by creating a conflicting
malicious transaction with a higher fee, which will incentivize
miners to discard the user’s transaction. We assume three types
of exclusively occurring attackers, each targeting one of three
components of our framework: 1) the attacker with access
to the user’s private key wallet, 2) the attacker that tampers
with the client, and for completeness we also assume 3) the
attacker with access to the authenticator. Next, we assume that
the legitimate user correctly executes the proposed protocols
and h(.) is an instantiation of RO.
B. Design Space
As we present in Section VIII, there are many types of
wallets with different properties. In our context, to achieve self-
sovereignty we identify smart-contract wallets as a promising
category. These wallets manage crypto-tokens by the function-
ality of smart contracts, enabling users to have customized
control over their wallets. The advantages of these solutions
are that spending rules can be explicitly specified and then
enforced by the cryptocurrency platform itself. Therefore,
using this approach, it is possible to build a flexible wallet with
features such as daily spending limits or transfer limits. More-
over, with spending rules encoded within a smart contract, it
is feasible to design and implement custom security features,
such as an air-gapped 2FA using OTPs, which is the goal of our
work. In such a setting, an air-gapped authenticator produces
OTPs to authenticate transactions at the smart contract.
We define the necessary security requirements for 2FA
realized by OTPs using the smart contract as follows:
1) Authenticity: each OTP must be associated only with
a single authenticator instance and thus must allow the
verification of the authenticity of an OTP.
2) Linkage: each OTPi must be linked with exactly a single
operation Oi, ensuring that OTPi cannot be misused for
the authentication of Oj , i 6= j.
3) Independence: an OTPi linked with the operation Oi
cannot be derived from OTPj of an operation Oj , i 6= j
or an arbitrary set of other OTPs.
We argue that not all solutions are feasible for such a
purpose. Asymmetric cryptography primitives such as digital
signatures or zero-knowledge proofs are inadequate in this
setting, despite the fact that they meet all OTP requirements.
State-of-the-art signature schemes [6], [44], [13] with a short
signature size produce a 32B-64B long output. However,
transferring even 32B in a fully air-gapped environment by
transcribing mnemonic words [63] would lack usability for
regular users – transcription of 24 mnemonic words [63] takes
28s on average (considering data from the study [32]). Another
drawback of asymmetric cryptography relates to its resource
demands that increase the operational costs, both on authen-
ticators and on smart contracts (smart contract platforms put
a high execution cost for asymmetric cryptography). Finally,
most of the currently deployed asymmetric constructions are
vulnerable to quantum computing [5].
The problem of long signatures exists also in hash-based
signature constructs [47], [33], [55]. Lamport-Diffie one-time
signatures (LD-OTS) [47] produce an output of length 2|h(.)|2,
which, for example in the case of |h(.)| = 16B yields 4kB-
long signatures. The signature size of LD-OTS can be reduced
by using one string of one-time key for simultaneous signing
of several bits in the message digest (i.e., Winternitz one-time
signatures (W-OTS) [33]) but at the expense of exponentially
increased number of hash computations (in the number of
encoded bits) during a signature generation and verification.
The extreme case minimizing the size of W-OTS to |h(.)|
(for simplicity omitting checksum) would require 2|h(.)| hash
computations for signature generation, which is unfeasible.
Approaches based on symmetric cryptography primitives
produce much shorter outputs, but it is challenging to imple-
ment them with smart-contract wallets. Widely used one-time
passwords like HOTP [59] or TOTP [60] require the user to
share a secret key k with the authentication server. Then, with
each authentication request the user proves that he posses k by
returning the output of an Fk(.) computed with a nonce (i.e.,
HOTP) or the current timestamp (i.e., TOTP). This approach is
insecure in our setting, as the user would have to share secret
k with a smart-contract wallet, making k publicly visible.
A solution that does not need to publicly disclose secret
information, and, at the same time, provides short enough
OTPs (e.g., 16B ' 12 mnemonic words), can be implemented
by Lamport’s hash chains [48]. A hash chain enables the
production of many OTPs by the consecutive execution of
a hash function, starting from k that represents a secret key
of the authenticator. Upon the initialization, a smart contract
is preloaded with the last generated value hn(k). When the
user wants to authenticate the ith operation, he sends the
hn−i(k) to the smart contract. The smart contract computes
the hash function consecutively i times and checks to ascertain
whether the obtained value equals the stored value. However,
the main disadvantage of this solution is that each OTP can be
trivially derived from any previous one. Therefore, selective
authentication is impossible, as revealing the ith OTP allows
the attacker to derive any jth OTP, where j < i. In short,
this scheme does not meet the security requirement on the
independence of OTPs.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
For a generic cryptocurrency described in Section II, we
propose a 2FA against the blockchain (see Section VIII-A),
which consists of: 1) a client C, 2) a private key hardware
wallet W, 3) a smart-contract wallet S, and 4) an air-gapped
authenticator A (see Figure 1). We first explain the key idea of
our approach, which enables us to realize the authenticator as a
fully air-gapped device. Then, we present the base protocol of
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Authenticator A Smart Contract S
{tx constructor(root)}
event ContrDeployed(SID) Store PKU
Store root
Remote transfer
Local air-gapped transfer
Generate OTPs
Store h0, h1, ...
Delete OTPs and k
Compute root 
h01 h23
h0 h1 h2 h3
h0123
Fk(0)Fk(1) Fk(2)Fk(3)
h45 h67
h4 h5 h6 h7
h4567
Fk(4)Fk(5) Fk(6)Fk(7)
root
a)  k := random()
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
b)
c)
e)
f)
Blockchain
Private Key
{tx constructor(root,PKU)}
{tx constructor(root, PKU)}Local connection transfer 
(e.g.,  USB, Bluetooth)
k
Add PKU to tx
Generate seed k
Client C Wallet W
SKU, PKU := Σ.KeyGen()
 hOTPs
Fig. 1: Bootstrapping of SmartOTPs in a secure environment (ΠSB).
our approach, and finally, we incrementally show modifications
that improve the efficiency and usability of our approach.
A. Design of an Air-Gapped Authenticator
We propose an approach where OTPs are generated by
a pseudo-random function Fk(.) and then aggregated by a
Merkle tree, providing a single value – the root hash. In
contrast to digital signatures (such as RSA, DSA, Lamport
signatures [47], Merkle signatures [55], Winternitz signa-
tures [33], etc.), the root hash serves only for proving the non-
repudiation of a particular OTP, not an arbitrary message. To
overcome this limitation, we propose a two-stage protocol ΠO,
in which, an operation O is first submitted to the blockchain
where it obtains an identifier opID. Then, in the second stage,
OopID is executed upon authentication by OTPopID that is
unambiguously associated with the identifier of this operation.
A challenge of such an approach is the OTP size. Using
the naı¨ve version of our scheme, a 2FA requires A to provide
an OTP and its proof. However, in such a naı¨ve version, the
user U has to transfer O + S × H bytes from A each time
he confirms an operation, where O represents the size of an
OTP, S represents the output size of a hash function, and H
represents the height of a Merkle tree with N leaves; hence
H = log2(N ). For example, if O = S = 32B and H = 10,
then U would have to transfer 352B each time he confirms
an operation, which has very low usability in an air-gapped
setting utilizing transcription of mnemonic words [63] (i.e.,
264 words). Even further reduction of O and S to 16B would
not help to resolve this issue, as the amount of user transferred
data would be equal to 176B ' 132 words.
We make the observation that it is possible to decouple
providing OTPs from providing their proofs. In this setting, the
only data that need to be kept secret are OTPs, while any node
of a Merkle tree may potentially be disclosed – no OTP can
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{tx initOp(args)}U
event InitOpEvent(opID)     
 
Σ.VerifyVerify(tx.Verifyσ, PKU)
OTPopID := Fk(opID)
Verify OopID is pending
Create OopID
Verify OTPopID
event ConfirmOpEvent(opID)
Execute OopID
Create proof for OTPopID 
args := operation, 
param, address
Input from user {tx confirmOp(OTPopID, πopID, opID)}    
   
Authenticator A
OTPs
[k]
[SKU]
Σ.VerifySign(tx, SKU)
Blockchain
 OTP
opID
opID
{tx initOp(args)}U
{tx initOp(args)}
Remote transfer
Local air-gapped transfer
Local connection transfer 
(e.g.,  USB, Bluetooth)
Confirm tx by U
Private Key
Client C Wallet W
 hOTPs
PKUroot
Fig. 2: Execution of an operation (ΠO).
be derived from these nodes. Therefore, we propose providing
OTPs by A, while their proofs can be constructed at C from
stored hashes of OTPs. This modification enables us to fetch
the nodes of the proof from the storage of C, while U has
to transfer only the OTP itself from A when confirming an
operation (i.e, O = 16B ' 12 mnemonic words by default).
B. Base Version
Protocol for Secure Bootstrapping. As common in other
schemes and protocols, we assume a secure environment
for the bootstrapping protocol ΠSB (see Figure 1 and Ap-
pendix E). First, A generates a secret seed k and W generates
a private/public key-pair SKU, PKU ← Σ.KeyGen(). Next,
U transfers k from A to C in an air-gapped manner (i.e.,
transcribing a few mnemonic words). Then, C generates OTPs
by computing Fk(i) | i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, where N is the
number of leaves (equal to the number of OTPs in the base
version). Next, C computes and stores the leaves of the tree
– i.e., the hashes of the OTPs (i.e., hOTPs), which do not
contain any confidential data.1 After this step, k and the OTPs
are deleted from C, and C computes the root hash from stored
hashes of the OTPs. Then, C creates a transaction containing
constructor of S (see Algorithm 1) with the root hash as the
argument and passes it to W for appending PKU.2 Finally,
C sends the transaction with the constructor to the blockchain
where the deployment of S is made.3 In the constructor, the
root hash with PKU are stored and ID of S (i.e., SID) is
assigned by a blockchain platform and returned in a response.4
1To improve performance during provisioning of proofs, C might addition-
ally to hOTPs store non-leaf nodes of the tree.
2No signature is appended by W since a secure environment is assumed.
3We emphasize that C has a provided template of S and the deployment
process is unnoticeable for the users.
4Note that SID represents a public identification of S, which serves as a
destination for sending crypto-tokens to S by any party. E.g., in Ethereum [78],
SID is represented by an address of S and is computed in a deterministic way
using PKU and the number of transactions executed by U.
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Algorithm 1: Smart contract S with 2FA
. VARIABLES AND FUNCTIONS OF ENVIRONMENT:
tx: a current transaction that called S,
balance: the current balance of a contract,
transfer(r, v): transfer v crypto-tokens from a smart contract to r,
. DECLARATION OF TYPES:
Operation { addr, param, pending, type ∈ {TRANSFER, . . .} }
. DECLARATION OF FUNCTIONS:
function constructor(r, pk) public
operations ← []; . An append-only list
PKU ← pk;
rootHash ← r;
nextOpID ← 0; . ID of the next operation (opID)
return SID; . Computed by a bl. platform.
function initOp(a, p, type) public
assert Σ.verify(tx.σ, PKU); . 1st factor of 2FA
opID ← nextOpID++;
operations[opID] ← new Operation(a, p, true, type);
function confirmOp(otp, pi, opID) public
assert operations[opID].pending;
verifyOTP(otp, pi, opID); . 2nd factor of 2FA
execOp(operations[opID]);
operations[opID].pending ← false;
function verifyOTP (otp, piopID , opID) private
assert deriveRootHash(otp, piopID , opID) = rootHash;
function execOp(oper) private
if TRANSFER = oper.type then
assert oper.param ≤ balance;
transfer(oper.addr, oper.param);
Storing the root hash and PKU binds an instance of S with
the user’s authenticator A and the user’s private key wallet
W, respectively. In detail, PKU enables S to verify whether
an arbitrary transaction was signed by the user who created
S, while the root hash enables a verification whether an OTP
was produced by the user’s A.
Operation Execution. When the wallet framework is initial-
ized, it is ready for executing operations. To provide a 2-factor
authentication capability, we split the protocol of an operation
execution ΠO into two stages (see Figure 2 and Appendix E):
1) Initialization Stage. When U decides to execute an
operation with SmartOTPs, he enters the details of the
operation into C that creates a transaction calling initOp(),
which is provided with operation-specific parameters –
the type of operation (e.g., transfer), a numerical pa-
rameter (e.g., amount or daily limit), and an address
parameter (e.g., recipient). Then, C sends this transaction
to W, which displays the details of the transaction and
prompts U to confirm signing by a hardware button. Upon
confirmation, W signs the transaction by SKU and sends
it back to C.5 C forwards the transaction to S. In the
function initOp(), S verifies whether the signature was
created by U (the first factor of authentication), stores the
parameters of the operation, and then assigns a sequential
ID (i.e., opID) to the initiated operation. In the response
from S, C is provided with an opID.
2) Confirmation Stage. After the transaction (that initiated
the operation) is persisted on the blockchain, U proceeds
to the second stage of ΠO. U passes opID to A, which,
in turn, computes and displays OTPopID as Fk(opID).
Storing hOTPs computed from OTPs at C enables U to
5We require W to be a hardware wallet with display (e.g., [73], [50], [45],
[10], [35]), enabling U to verify the details of transactions being signed.
transfer only the displayed OTP from A to C, which can
be accomplished in an air-gapped manner. Considering a
mnemonic implementation [63], this means an air-gapped
transfer of 12 words in the case of O = 16B. Then, C
computes and appends the corresponding proof piopID
to the OTP. The proof of the OTP is computed from
stored hOTPs in the C’s storage (or directly fetched
from the storage if C stores all nodes of the Merkle
tree). Next, C sends a transaction with OTPopID and
its proof piopID to the blockchain, calling the function
confirmOp() of S, which handles the second factor of
authentication. This function verifies the authenticity of
the OTP (i.e., the first requirement on OTPs) and its
association with the requested operation (i.e., the second
requirement on OTPs), which together implies the cor-
rectness of the passed OTP.6 In detail, upon calling the
confirmOp() function with opID, OTPopID, and piopID
as the arguments, S reconstructs the root hash from the
provided arguments by the function deriveRootHash() that
is presented in Appendix B.7 In this function, first a check
of the correct length of piopID is made in order to avoid a
second pre-image attack on the root hash. Second, an OTP
index is derived from piopID,8 and then the derived index
is compared with the index of an operation that U passed
in the arguments (i.e., opID). If this check is successful,
then the root hash is reconstructed and compared with the
expected root hash in the calling function verifyOTP(). In
the positive case, the operation is executed (e.g., crypto-
tokens are transferred).
In the following, we present extensions of SmartOTPs, improv-
ing its efficiency and usability, and introducing new features.
Protocol for Bootstrapping in an Insecure Environment.
The main advantage of ΠSB described above is its high usabil-
ity, requiring only an air-gapped transfer of k and connected
W. However, ΠSB is not resistant against tampering with C
– the attacker might intercept k or forge root for root′.
Similarly, the attacker might forge PKU for PKM, while
staying unnoticeable for U who expects that SID obtained
is correct. Therefore, we propose an alternative bootstrapping
protocol ΠIB (see Appendix E), assuming that the adversary
can tamper with C during bootstrapping. To accomplish such
bootstrapping, first we protect from the interception of k and
then from forging of root and PKU for the malicious ones.
To avoid the interception of k, instead of transferring k,
U performs a transfer of all leaves of the Merkle tree (i.e.,
hOTPs) from A to C, which can be realized with a microSD
card. Note that the leaves are hashes of OTPs, hence they do
not contain a confidential data. Next, to protect from forging
of PKU and root, we require a deterministic computation of
SID by a blockchain platform using PKU and root, hence
SID can be computed and displayed together with root in
W before the deployment of S. In detail, SID is computed as
h(PKU ‖ root), and thus each pair of public key and root hash
maps to the only SID. Even with the previous modification,
root can be still forged by C. Therefore, when transaction with
the constructor is sent to W, U has to compare root displayed
6Note that SmartOTPs meet the third requirement on OTPs by the design.
7Note that this algorithm contains, not yet described, improvements.
8Note that each item of the proof dedicates one bit to indicate the left/right
position of this item in the Merkle tree, enabling us to derive the opID.
5
at W with the one computed and displayed by A. In the case
of equality, U records SID displayed in W, while he can be
sure that SID is associated with legitimate PKU and root.
C. Increasing the Number of OTPs
A small number of OTPs can have usability and secu-
rity consequences. First, users executing many transactions9
would need to create new OTPs often, and thus change their
addresses. Second, an attacker possessing SKU can flood S
with initialized operations, rendering all the OTPs unusable.
Therefore, we need to increase the number of OTPs in order
to make an attack unfeasible. However, increasing the number
of OTPs linearly increases the amount of data that C needs
to preserve in its storage (i.e., leaves of the tree or all nodes
of the tree). For example, if the number of OTPs is 220, then
C has to store 16.7MB of data (considering S = 16B and
C storing only hOTPs), which is feasible even on storage-
limited devices. However, e.g., for 235 OTPs, C needs to store
549.8GB of data, which may be inconvenient even on PCs.
To resolve this issue, we modify the base approach by
applying a time-space trade-off method [41] for OTPs. Namely,
we introduce hash chains of which last items are aggregated by
a Merkle tree. With such a construction, OTPs can be encoded
as elements of a chain and revealed layer by layer in the reverse
direction to the direction of creating the chains. This allows
multiplication of the number of OTPs by the chain length
without increasing the C’s storage overhead, but imposing a
larger number of hash computations on S and A. Nevertheless,
smart contract platforms put only a low execution cost for hash
operations.
An illustration of this construction is presented in the
bottom left part of Figure 3.10 A hash chain of length P is
built from each OTP assumed so far. Then, the last items of all
hash chains are used as the first iteration layer, which provides
N
P OTPs.
11 Similarly, the penultimate items of all the hash
chains are used as the second iteration layer, etc., until the
last iteration layer consisting of the first items of hash chains
(i.e., outputs of Fk(.)) has been reached – see the middle part
of Figure 3. We emphasize that introducing hash chains may
cause a violation of the requirement on the independence of
OTPs if implemented naı¨vely; i.e., OTPs from upper iteration
layers can be derived from lower layers. Therefore, to enforce
this requirement, we invalidate all the OTPs of the previous
iteration layers by a sliding window at S.
The authenticator has to be updated to provide OTPs by
getOTP (i) = hα(i)
(
Fk
(
β(i)
))
, (1)
where i is an operation ID, α(i) determines an index in a hash
chain, and β(i) determines an index in the last iteration layer
of OTPs. We provide concrete expressions for α(i) and β(i)
in Equation 3, which involves all proposed improvements and
optimizations. A derivation of the root hash from the OTP at S
needs to be updated as well (see Algorithm 6 in Appendix).12
9E.g., several smart contracts in Ethereum have over 220 transactions made.
10Note that this figure contains further, not yet described, improvements.
11We assume for simplicity that the greatest common divisor of N,P is P .
12Note that the algorithm contains further, not yet described, improvements.
Algorithm 2: Introduction of a new root hash at S
L1 ← []; . Items have form < h(new root hash ‖ OTP) >
L2 ← []; . Items have form <new root hash>
function 1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP) public
assert Σ.verify(tx.σ, PKU);
assert nextOpID % N = N − 1; . The last oper. of tree
L1.append(hRootAndOTP);
function 2 newRootHash(rootnew) public
assert Σ.verify(tx.σ, PKU);
assert nextOpID % N = N − 1; . The last oper. of tree
L2.append(rootnew);
function 3 newRootHash(otp, pi) public
assert nextOpID % N = N − 1; . The last oper. of tree
verifyOTP(otp, pi, nextOpID);
for {i← 0; i < L2.len; i++} do
for {j ← 0; j < L1.len; j++} do
if h(L2[i] ‖ otp) = L1[j] then
rootHash ← L2[i];
L1, L2 ← [], [];
nextOpID++;
In detail, S needs to execute P − α(i) − 1 =
⌊
iP
N
⌋
hash
computations, which is a complementary number to a number
of hash computations at A with regard to the length of hash
chain P. Also, C has to be modified, requiring computation of
a proof to use a leaf index relative to a current iteration layer
of OTPs, computed as i % NP .
With this improvement, given the number of leaves equal
to 220 and P = 215, C stores only 16.7MB of data,13 while it
can use 235 OTPs within a single tree. On the other hand, this
approach requires, on average, the execution of additional P/2
hash computations at S, imposing additional costs. However,
our experiments show the benefits of this approach, as shown
in Section V-A.
D. Depletion of OTPs
Even with the previous modification, the number of OTPs
remains bounded, and thus once they may be depleted. We
propose handling depleted OTPs by a special operation that
replaces the current tree with a new one. To introduce a
new tree securely, we propose updating the root hash value
while using the last OTP of the current tree for confirmation.
Nevertheless, for this purpose we cannot use ΠO consisting of
two stages, as the attacker possessing SKU could be “faster”
than the user and might initialize the last operation and thus
block all the user’s funds. If we were to allow repeated
initialization of this operation, then we would create a race
condition issue. To avoid this race condition issue, we propose
a protocol ΠNR that replaces the root hash during three stages
of interaction with the blockchain, which require two append-
only lists L1 and L2 (see Algorithm 2):
1) U enters OTPN−1 to C. C sends h(OTPN−1 ‖ rootnew)
to S, which appends it to L1.
2) C sends rootnew to S, which appends it to L2.
3) C passes OTPN−1 with piN−1 to S, where the first
matching entries of L1 and L2 are located in order to
perform the introduction of rootnew. Finally, the lists are
cleared for future updates.
13Hashes built from the first iteration layer of OTPs.
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Fig. 3: An overview of our approach and its improvements. In the left part of the figure, we depict the partitioning of a tree into subtrees. For
each subtree we append hash chains that balance the size of the client’s storage and the number of hash computations at the smart contract.
In the middle part of the figure, we depict the adjustment of the next parent tree. In the right part of the figure, we depict the details of a
subtree, which contains a split control in the provision/verification of OTPs (and their proofs) across the components of our framework. In
detail, OTPs are provided by the authenticator, while proofs are constructed from the Hth layer of the parent Merkle tree stored at the client.
A proof contains only HS − LS nodes, as the remaining LS nodes are under the control of the smart contract.
Locating the first entries in the lists relies on the append-
only feature of lists, and hence no attacker can make the
first valid pair of entries in the lists. With this improvement,
A must compute and display h(OTPN−1 ‖ rootnew) and
rootnew to enable protection against attacker that tampers
with C. Thanks to it, U can verify an equality of these items
displayed at W with the ones displayed at A during the
first and the second stage of ΠNR, preventing malicious C
from forging the tree. In order to adapt this improvement at
C, C needs to compute and store leaves associated with a
new tree. Therefore, the user provides C with the leaves of
the new tree, which are transferred from A by a microSD
card (i.e., protocol ΠINR). Alternatively, the new leaves can
be transferred by a transcription of k from A to C, if a
secure environment is assumed (i.e., protocol ΠSNR). We refer
the reader to Appendix E for a detailed description of both
protocols.
E. Cost Optimizations
Caching at the Smart Contract. With a high Merkle tree, the
reconstruction of the root hash from a leaf node may be costly.
Although the number of hash computations coming from the
Merkle tree is logarithmic in the number of leaves, the cost
imposed on the blockchain platform may be significant for
higher trees. We propose to reduce this cost by caching an
arbitrary tree layer of depth L at S, and do proof verifications
against a cached layer. Hence, each call of deriveRootHash()
will execute L fewer hash computations in contrast to the
version that reconstructs the root hash, while C will transfer
by L fewer elements in the proof.
The minimal operational cost can be achieved by directly
caching leaves of the tree, which accounts only for hash
computations coming from hash chains, not a Merkle tree.
However, storing such an amount of cached data on the
blockchain is too expensive. Therefore, this cost optimization
must be viewed as a trade-off between the depth L of the
cached layer and the price required for the storage of such
a cached layer at the blockchain (see Section V-A, where an
optimal L is determined).
We depict this modification in the left part of Figure 3,
and we show that an optimal caching layer can be further
partitioned into caching sublayers of subtrees (we introduce
subtrees later). The right part of Figure 3 shows how we com-
bine Merkle tree and hash chains. To enable this optimization,
the cached layer of the Merkle tree must be stored in the
constructor of S. Since that moment onward, the cached layer
replaces the functionality of the root hash, reducing the size of
proofs. During the confirmation stage of ΠO, an OTP and its
proof are used for the reconstruction of a particular node in the
cached layer, instead of the root hash. Then the reconstructed
value is compared with an expected node present in the cached
layer. The index of an expected node is computed as
idxInCache(i) =
⌊(
i %
N
P
)
/ 2H−L
⌋
, (2)
where i is the ID of an operation.
Partitioning to Subtrees. The caching of the optimal layer
minimizes the combined (i.e., deployment and operational)
costs of SmartOTPs, but on the other hand, it requires prepay-
ment for storing the cache on the blockchain. If the cached
layer were to contain a high number of nodes, then the initial
deployment cost could be prohibitively high, and moreover,
the user might not deplete all the prepaid OTPs.
To overcome this usability issue, we propose partitioning
an optimal cached layer to groups having the same size,
forming sublayers that belong to subtrees (see the left part
of Figure 3). Starting with the deployment of S, the cached
sublayer of the first subtree and the “parent” root hash are
passed to the constructor; the cached sublayer is stored on the
blockchain and its consistency against the parent root hash
is verified. Then during the operational stage of ΠO, when
confirmation of operation is performed, the passed OTP is
verified against an expected node in the cached sublayer of the
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Algorithm 3: Introduction of the next subtree at S
currentSubLayer[]; . Adjusted in the constructor
function nextSubtree(nextSubLayer, otp, piotp, picr) public
assert nextOpID % N 6= N − 1; . Not the last op. of parent
assert nextOpID % NS = NS − 1; . The last op. of subtree
assert currentSubLayer.len = nextSubLayer.len;
assert deriveRootHash(otp, piotp, nextOpID) = rootHash;
currentSubLayer ← nextSubLayer;
croot ← reduceMT(currentSubLayer, currentSubLayer.len);
assert subtreeConsistency(croot, picr , rootHash);
nextOpID++; . Accounts for this introduction of a subtree
current subtree, saving costs for not doing verification against
the parent root hash (see Algorithm 7 in Appendix).
If the last OTP of the current subtree is reached, then
no operation other than the introduction of the next subtree
can be initialized (see the green dashed arrow in Figure 3).
We propose a protocol ΠST for the introduction of the next
subtree (see Appendix E for the detailed description). Namely,
C introduces the next subtree in a single step by calling a
function nextSubtree() of S with the arguments containing: 1)
the last OTP of the current subtree OTP(NS−1)+δNS , δ ∈{1, . . . , N/NS − 1} with its proof piotp, and 2) the cached
sublayer of the next subtree with picr (the proof of the next
subtree’s root), both computed by C from its storage. The
pseudo-code of introducing the next subtree at S is shown
in Algorithm 3. The current subtree’s cached sublayer is
replaced by a new one, which is verified by the function
subtreeConsistency() against the parent root hash with the
use of the passed proof picr of the new subtree’s root. Notice
that introducing a new subtree invalidates all initialized and
not yet confirmed operations of the previous subtree.
At the authenticator, this improvement requires accom-
modating the iteration over layers of hash chains in shorter
periods. The authenticator provides OTPs by using Equation 1
with the following expressions:
α(i) = P −
⌊
(i % NS)P
NS
⌋
− 1,
β(i) =
⌊
i
NS
⌋
NS
P
+
(
i %
NS
P
)
,
(3)
where i is an operation ID and NS is the number of OTPs
provided by a single subtree. We remark, that due to this
optimization, the update of a new parent root hash as well
as the constructor of S requires, additionally to Algorithm 2
and Algorithm 1, the introduction of a cached sublayer of the
first subtree (currently omitted from simplicity).
V. REALIZATION IN PRACTICE
We have selected the Ethereum cryptocurrency and the
Solidity language for the implementation of S, HTML with
JS for DAPP of C, Java (Android) for smartphone App of
A,14 and Metamask [56] for W. We highlight that we instan-
tiated W by Metamask only for a proof-of-concept purpose,
since Metamask is a password-derived software wallet, and
thus it does not provide a resilience against adversary that
tampers with the client (see Section VI). To protect against
such an attacker, a hardware wallet must be used. In our
implementation, we selected the size of OTPs equal to 16B,
14Note that the authenticator App does not require any permissions.
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which has practical advantages for an air-gapped authenticator,
producing OTPs that are 12 mnemonic words long,15 and at
the same time, providing a sufficient security level for most
use cases. Next, we used SHA-3 (with truncated output to
16B) as h(.) as well as an instantiation of Fk(.) ≡ h(k || .).
We selected the size of k equal to 16B, enabling the user
to rewrite 12 mnemonic words to backup/restore A. So far,
we have considered only the crypto-token transfer operation.
However, our proposed protocol enables us to extend the set
of operations. For demonstration purposes, we extended the
operation set by supporting daily spending limits and last resort
information, which also contribute to the increased security
of SmartOTPs (see Appendix C). The source code of our
implementation contains 5 KLOC (see Table I in Appendix),
and we made it available upon publication of our work.
A. Analysis of the Costs
Executing smart contracts over blockchain, i.e., performing
computations and storing data, has its costs. In Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM), these costs are expressed by the level
of execution complexity of particular instructions, referred to
as gas. One unit of gas has its market price in GWEI. In this
section, we analyze the costs of our approach using the same
value of the hash size S as well as the OTP size O, namely,
16B. The S significantly influences the gas consumption for
storing the cached layer at the blockchain, while the effect of
O is negligible. We remark that measured costs can also be
influenced by EVM internals (e.g., 32B-long words and cor-
responding alignment). In the following, we perform a series
of gas measurements experiments investigating the parameters
of the Merkle tree and hash chains.
1) Costs Related to the Merkle Tree:
Deployment Cost. The cost of a smart contract deployment
is driven mainly by the depth LS of the cached sublayer of
the first subtree and the size S. A less significant factor is the
consistency check of a Merkle tree, which is driven by LS : the
higher LS is, the more layers need to be reduced. Similarly,
the greater H − HS is, the more steps need to be done in
the proof verification. On the other hand, deployment costs
are independent of the length P of a hash chain; therefore,
we omit the hash chain in this experiment and set P = 1.
Further, we abstract from the concept of subtrees in order
to analyze a single tree (i.e., H = HS). The deployment
costs of our scheme with respect to depth L (≡ LS) of the
cached layer are presented in Figure 4. The figure differentiates
two cases – one uses a single smart contract and the second
15Considering a dictionary size of 2048 words [63].
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Fig. 5: Average total cost per transfer (H = HS).
assumes a contract factory producing instances of the first
contract. Thanks to the contract factory, we managed to save
approximately 1.3M of gas, regardless of L, which we assume
in all the following. Since 8M is the maximum gas limit at
the Eth reum main network, we can build a caching layer with
LS = 7 at maximum. As we will see later, the maximum HS
that can be used for the optimal caching layer of a subtree is
HS = 10, yielding 210 leaves and thus 210P OTPs per subtree.
Cost of a Transfer. Although the cost of each operation
supported by the protocol ΠO is similar, for this experiment
we selected the transfer of crypto-tokens Ot. We measured the
average total cost per Ot as follows:
Ot cost(L, N, P ) = cost
(
Ot(L, N, P )
)
+
cost
(
Od(L)
)
N
,
cost
(
Ot(L, N, P )
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
cost
(
Oti(L, N, P )
)
,
cost
(
Oti(L, N, P )
)
= cost
(
Ot.initi ()
)
+ cost
(
Ot.confirmi (L, N, P )
)
,
where the function cost() measures the cost of an operation in
gas units, and Od represents the deployment operation. As the
purpose of the cached layer is to reduce the number of hash
computations in confirmOp(), the size of an optimal cached
layer is subject to a trade-off between the cost of storing the
cached layer at the blockchain and the savings benefit of the
caching. To explore the properties of the only Merkle tree, we
adjusted H = HS and P = 1. As each execution of Ot (i.e.,
Oti) may have a slightly different gas cost, we measured the
average cost of a transaction (i.e., cost(Ot(L, N, P )) for both
stages of ΠO.16 For completeness, we present the transaction
costs of all proposed operations in Appendix D. In Figure 5,
we can see that the total average cost per transfer decreases
with the increasing number of OTPs, as the deployment cost
is spread across more OTPs. The optimal point depicted
in the figure minimizes Ot by balancing cost(Od(L))) and
cost(Ot(L, N, P )). An important observation is that L for
such an optimal point equals H − 3. In contrast to the version
without caching, this optimization has brought a cost reduction
of 3.87%, 5.61%, 7.32%, and 8.92%, for 128, 256, 512, and
1,024 leaves (i.e., OTPs here), respectively.
Another aspect that we explored is the number of transfer
operations to be executed until a profit of the caching optimiza-
tion has begun (see Figure 7). We computed a rolling average
cost per Ot, while distinguishing between the optimal caching
16Note that the cost of initOp() is equal to ∼ 70k of gas for all the
operations.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0E+00
1E+06
2E+06
3E+06
4E+06
5E+06
6E+06
7E+06
8E+06
Next Subtree
Operation
Ethereum
Limit
Depth of Cached Layer
C
os
t[
ga
s]
(LS)
Fig. 6: Cost of introducing the next subtree (H = 20, HS = 10).
layer and disabled caching – the profit from caching begins
after 53, 90, and 156 transfers, respectively.
Costs with Subtrees. We measured the cost of introducing the
next subtree within a parent tree depending on LS , while we set
H = 20 and HS = 10 (see Figure 6). We found out that when
subtrees (and their cached sublayers) are introduced within a
dedicated operation, it is significantly cheaper in contrast to
introducing subtrees during the deployment.
2) Costs Related to Hash Chains:
Since each iteration layer of hash chains contributes to an
average cost of confirmOp() with around the same value,
we measured this value on a few trees with P up to 512.
Next, using this value and the deployment cost, we calculated
the average total cost per transfer by adding layers of hash
chains to a tree with H = HS , and thus increasing N by a
factor of P until the minimum cost was found. As a result,
the optimal caching layer shifted to the leaves of the tree (see
Figure 8a), which would, however, exceed the gas limit of
Ethereum. To respect the gas limit, we adjusted L = 7, as
depicted in Figure 8b. In contrast to the configurations with
L = 0 and P = 1 (from Figure 5), we achieved savings of
27.80%, 19.61%, 14.95%, and 12.51% for trees with H equal
to 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively. For the sake of completeness,
we calculated costs for L = 0 as well (see Figure 8c). Note
that for L = 0 and L = 7, smaller trees are “less expensive,” as
they require less operations related to the proof verification in
contrast to bigger trees; these operations consume substantially
more gas than operations related to the hash chains. Although
in this experiment we minimized the total cost per transfer
by finding an optimal P , we highlight that increasing P
contributes to the cost only minimally, but on the other hand,
it increases the variance of the cost. Hence, one may set this
parameter at even higher values, depending on the use case.
3) Costs in Fiat Money:
We assume the average exchange rate of ETH/USD equal
to 122 and the “standard” gas price 5 GWEI17 as of February
12, 2019. For example, in the case of N = 227 (i.e., H =
20, HS = 10, P = 2
7, LS = 7), expenses per transfer opera-
tion are $0.10, while expenses for deployment and introduction
of a new subtree are $5.02 and $0.71, respectively.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security properties of
our scheme and its resilience to individual attacker models,
assuming the random oracle model.
17https://ethgasstation.info/.
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Fig. 8: Average total cost per transfer with regards to the length P of hash chains.
A. The Attacker Possessing SKU
Security Claim 1. The attacker with access to SKU is able
to initiate operations by ΠO but is unable to confirm them.
Justification: The security of ΠO is achieved by meeting
all requirements on OTPs (see Section III-B). In detail, the
requirement on the independence of two different OTPs is
satisfied by the definition of Fk(.) ≡ h(k ‖ .), where h(.) is
instantiated by RO. This is applicable when P = 1. However,
if P > 1, then items in previous iteration layers of OTPs can
be computed from the next ones. Therefore, to enforce this
requirement, we employ an explicit invalidation of all OTPs
belonging to all previous iteration layers by a sliding window
at S (see Section IV-C). The requirement on the linkage of each
OTPi with operation Oi is satisfied thanks to 1) RO used for
instantiation of h(.) and 2) by the definition of the Merkle
tree, preserving the order of its aggregated leaves. By meeting
these requirements, the attacker is able to initiate an operation
Oj in the first stage of ΠO but is unable to use an OTPi
intercepted in the second stage of ΠO to confirm Oj , where
j 6= i. Finally, the requirement on the authenticity of OTPs is
ensured by a random generation of k and by anchoring the
root hash associated with k at the constructor of S.
Security Claim 2. Assuming δ ∈ {0,..., NNS − 2}: the attacker
with access to SKU is unable to deplete all OTPs or misuse
a stolen OTP that introduces the (δ+ 1)th subtree by ΠST .
Justification: When all but one OTPs of the δth subtree
are depleted, the last remaining operation O(NS−1)+δNS , δ ∈
{0, ..., NNS − 2} is enforced by S to be the introduction of the
next subree. This operation is executed in a single transaction
calling the function nextSubtree() of S (see Algorithm 3)
requiring the corresponding OTP(NS−1)+δNS that is under
control of U; hence the attacker cannot execute the function to
proceed with a further depletion of OTPs in (δ+ 1)th subtree.
If the attacker were to intercept OTP(NS−1)+δNS during the
execution of ΠST by U, he could use the intercepted OTP
only for the introduction of the next valid subtree since the
function nextSubtree() also checks a valid cached sublayer
of the (δ+ 1)th subtree against the parent root hash.
Security Claim 3. Assuming δ = NNS − 1: the attacker with
access to SKU is neither able to deplete all OTPs nor
introduce a new parent tree nor render SmartOTPs unusable.
Justification: In contrast to the adjustment of the next
subtree, the situation here is more difficult to handle, since the
new parent tree cannot be verified at S against any paramount
field. If we were to use ΠO (see Section IV) while constraining
to the last initialized operation O(N−1)+ηN , η ∈ {0,1,...} of
the parent tree, then the attacker could render SmartOTPS
unusable by submitting an arbitrary root hash in initOp()
and thus block all the funds of the user. If we were to allow
repeated initialization of this operation, then we would create a
race condition issue. Therefore, this operation needs to be han-
dled outside of the protocol ΠO, using two unlimited append-
only lists L1 and L2 that are manipulated in three stages of
interaction with the blockchain (see Section IV-D and ΠNR in
Appendix E). In the first stage, h(rootnew ‖ OTP(N−1)+ηN )
is appended to L1, hence the attacker cannot extract the
value of OTP. In the second stage, rootnew is appended to
L2, and finally, in the third stage, the user reveals the OTP
for confirmation of the first matching entries in both lists.
Although the attacker might use an intercepted OTP from the
third stage for appending malicious arguments into L1 and L2,
when he proceeds to the third stage and submits the intercepted
OTP to S, the user’s entries will match as the first ones, and
thus a benign parent root hash will be introduced.
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B. The Attacker that Tampers with the Client
Security Claim 4. If the client is tampered with after boot-
strapping, the user can detect such a situation and prevent any
malicious operation from being initialized.
Justification: If we were to assume that W is realized
as a software wallet, then the attacker tampering with C
might also tamper with the W’s software running on the same
machine. This would in turn enable a malicious operation to
be initialized and further confirmed by the user, since the user
would be presented by a legitimate data in C and W, while
the transactions would contain malicious data. Therefore, we
require that W is realized as a hardware wallet with a display,
which exposes only signing capabilities, while SKU never
leaves the device (e.g., [73], [45], [10], [35]). Thanks to it, the
user can verify the details of a transaction being signed in W
and confirm signing only if the details match the information
shown in C (for ΠO) or A (for ΠINR). We refer the reader
to the work of Arapinis et al. [3] for the security analysis of
hardware wallets with displays.
Security Claim 5. If the client is tampered with during an
execution of ΠIB , the attacker can neither intercept k nor forge
the root hash nor forge PKU.
Justification: When the protocol ΠIB is used, instead
of an air-gapped transfer of confidential k from A to C, the
user transfers leaves of the Merkle tree by microSD card. The
leaves of the Merkle tree represent hashes of OTPs in the base
version or the hashes of the last items of hash chains in the
full version of SmartOTPs. In both cases the transferred data
do not contain any confidential information, hence the attacker
cannot take advantage of intercepting them. The next option
that the attacker may seek for is to forge the root hash root
for root′ and PKU for PKM, which results in different SID
than in the case of root and PKU, since SID is computed as
h(PKU ‖ root). While PKU is stored at W, the authenticity
of root needs to be verified by comparing values at displays
of A and W. Only in the case of equality, the user can be sure
that SID displayed in W maps to benign PKU and root.
C. The Attacker Possessing the Authenticator
It is trivial to see that the attacker with access to A is unable
to initialize any operation with SmartOTPs. This property is
inherited from general 2FA schemes that use OTPs.
D. Further Properties and Implications
Requirement on Block Confirmations. Most cryptocurren-
cies suffer from long time to finality, potentially enabling the
accidental forks, which create parallel inconsistent blockchain
views. On the other hand, this issue is not present at blockchain
platforms with fast finality, such as Algorand [38], HoneyBad-
gerBFT [57], enabling the direct application of SmartOTPs. In
the context of blockchains with long time to finality, overly
fast confirmation of an operation may be dangerous, as, if
an operation were initiated in an “incorrect” view, an attacker
holding SKU would hijack the OTP and reuse it for a malicious
operation settled in the “correct” view. To prevent this threat,
the recommendation is to wait for several block confirmations
to ensure that an accidental fork has not happened. For
example, in Ethereum, the recommended number of block
confirmations to wait is 12 (i.e., ∼3 minutes). Note that such
waiting can be done as a background task of C, hence the user
does not have to wait: 1) considering the attacker that possesses
SKU, C can detect such a fork during the waiting and resubmit
the initOp() transaction if needed, 2) considering the attacker
that tampers with C, the user might be deceived to reveal an
OTP of an operation that had been initiated in the “incorrect”
view but never signs an attacker’s transaction (thanks to the
hardware wallet), 3) the attacker possessing A is unrelated,
since he cannot interfere with initialization of operations.
Attacks with a Post Quantum Computer. Although a re-
silience to quantum computing (QC) is not the focus of this
paper, it is worth to note that our scheme inherits a resilience
to QC from the hash-based cryptography. The resilience of our
scheme to QC is dependent on the output size of the functions
Fk(.) and h(.) used for the generation of OTPs and their
aggregation, respectively. A generic QC attack against these
functions is Grover’s algorithm [40], providing a quadratic
speedup in searching for the input of the black box function.
As indicated by recent research [2] using this algorithm (under
realistic assumptions), the security of SHA-3 is reduced from
256 to 166 bits; in our case 98 bits, which provides near term
security (i.e., 10 years).
VII. DISCUSSION
Passwords. For simplicity, in the description of our ap-
proach we abstracted from password protection at A and W.
However, to achieve (2 + 1/1)-factor authentication (see Sec-
tion VIII-A), it is necessary to set them up. This authentication
scheme represents signatures made by SKU and OTPs from
A + a password to access W and a password to access A.
Usability. Our approach inherits the common usability char-
acteristics of 2FA schemes, such as an extra device to carry,18
effort for securely storing recovery phrase k, effort for recall-
ing/entering passwords, and effort for an air-gapped transfer
of OTPs, which, according to Dhakal et al. [32], takes 14s on
average. Note that these usability implications are the same as
in the case of existing smart contract wallets with 2FA [25],
[75]. However, in contrast to them, the user might have only a
single hardware wallet (instead of two), while the authenticator
can be realized as an App on a smartphone, which most of the
users already possess. In addition to the previous, our approach
requires the user to introduce a new subtree/parent tree once in
a while. Nevertheless, we envision this effort to be related only
to large businesses rather than regular users; considering the
example from Section V-A3, the user has to introduce the next
subtree after using 132,072 OTPs, while 134,217,728 OTPs
are available to use before re-initialization of a new parent tree.
Costs. With consumption of up to ∼ 140k gas units per
operation, our approach is comparable to equivalent 2FA solu-
tions based on smart contracts: Ethereum MultiSigWallet [25]
requires ∼ 275k gas units19 and TrezorMultisig2of3 [75] re-
quires ∼ 95k gas units20 per operation.
18Assuming that the user already has a hardware wallet (the first factor).
19https://etherscan.io/tx/0xdb6e938... and https://etherscan.io/tx/0x328a7cc...
20https://etherscan.io/tx/0xfc7bbdd... (two signatures in a single transaction).
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General Purpose Applicability. In this work, we focused on
smart contract wallets. However, we remark that the protocols
of our scheme can be utilized in any smart contract based
application for the purpose of 2-factor authentication.
VIII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first compare SmartOTPs with other
hash-based cryptography approaches, then we propose a clas-
sification of blockchain-related authentication schemes, and
finally we extend the previous work of Eskandari et al. [36] and
Bonneau et al. [14], by categorizing and reviewing examples
of cryptocurrency wallet solutions. For an overview of these
solutions, we refer the reader to Appendix F.
Related Hash-Based Approaches. Although Merkle signa-
tures [55] utilize Merkle trees for aggregation of several one-
time verification keys (e.g., [47]), the size of these keys and
signatures is substantially larger than in the case of Smart-
OTPs. Even further optimization of the signature size (i.e.,
Winternitz OTS [33]) does not make signatures so short as in
SmartOTPs. Next, we highlight that we utilize hash chains for
multiplication of OTPs, which is different than their application
in Winternitz OTS [33] that utilize them for the purpose of
reducing the size of a single Lamport-Diffie OTS [47] by
encoding multiple bits of a message digest into the number
of recurrent hash computations.
A. Classification of Authentication Schemes
In the context of the blockchain, we distinguish between
k-factor authentication against the blockchain and k-factor
authentication against the authentication factors themselves.
For example, an authentication method may require a user to
perform 2-of-2 multi-signature in order to execute a transfer,
while the user may keep each private key stored in a dedicated
device – each requiring a different password. In this case, 2FA
is performed against the blockchain, since both signatures are
verified by all miners of the blockchain. Additionally, a one-
factor authentication is performed once in each device of the
user by entering a password in each of them. For clarity we
classify authentication schemes by the following notation:(
Z +X1
/
...
/
XZ
)
,
where Z ∈ {0,1,...} represents the number of authentica-
tion factors against the blockchain and Xi ∈ {0,1,...} | i ∈
[1,...,Z] represents the number of authentication factors
against the i-th factor of Z. With this in mind, we remark that
the previous example provides
(
2 + 1/1
)
-factor authentication:
twice against the blockchain (i.e., two signatures), once for
accessing the first device (i.e., the first password), and once
for accessing the second device (i.e., the second password).
Since the previous notation is insufficient for authentication
schemes that use secret sharing [70], we extend it as follows:(
Z(W1,...,WZ) +
(
X11 ,...,X
W1
1
)/
...
/(
X1Z ,...,X
WZ
Z
))
,
where Z has the same meaning as in the previous case,
Wi ∈ {0,1,...} | i ∈ [1,...,Z] denotes the minimum number of
secret shares required to use the complete i-th secret Xi. With
this in mind, we remark that the aforementioned example pro-
vides
(
2(1,1) + (1)/(1)
)
-factor authentication: twice against
the blockchain (i.e., two signatures), once for accessing the
first device (i.e., the first password), and once for accessing
the second device (i.e., the second password). We consider an
implicit value of Wi = 1; hence, the classification (2 + 1/1)
represents the same as the previous one (the first notation suf-
fices). If one of the private keys were additionally split into two
shares, each encrypted by a password, then such an approach
would provide
(
2(2,1) + (1,1)/(1)
)
-factor authentication.
B. Wallet Types
Keys in Local Storage. In this category of wallets, the
private keys are stored in plaintext form on the local storage
of a machine, thus providing (1 + 0)-factor authentication.
Examples that enable the use of unencrypted private key files
are Bitcoin Core [8] or MyEtherWallet [62] wallets.
Password-Protected Wallets. These wallets require a user-
specified password to encrypt a private key stored on the local
storage, thus providing (1 + 1)-factor authentication. Examples
that support this functionality are Armory Secure Wallet [4],
Electrum Wallet [34], MyEtherWallet [62], Bitcoin Core [8],
and Bitcoin Wallet [9]. This category addresses physical theft,
yet enables the brute force of passwords and digital theft (e.g.,
keylogger).
Password-Derived Wallets. Password-derived wallets [54]
(a.k.a., brain wallets or hierarchical deterministic wallets)
can compute a sequence of private keys from only a single
mnemonic string and/or password. This approach takes advan-
tage of the key creation in the ECDSA signature scheme that
is used by many blockchain platforms. Examples of password-
derived wallets are Electrum [34], Armory Secure Wallet [4],
Metamask [56], and Daedalus Wallet [30]. The wallets in
this category provide (1 +X1)-factor authentication (usually
X1 = 1) and also suffer from weak passwords [29].
Hardware Storage Wallets. In general, wallets of this cate-
gory include devices that can only sign transactions by private
keys stored inside sealed storage, while the keys never leave
the device. To sign a transaction, the user connects the device
to a machine and enters his passphrase. When signing a
transaction, the device displays the transaction’s data to the
user, who may verify the details. Thus, wallets of this category
usually provide (1 + 1)-factor authentication. Popular USB (or
Bluetooth) hardware wallets containing displays are offered by
Trezor [73], Ledger [50], KeepKey [45], and BitLox [10]. An
example of a USB wallet that is not resistant against tampering
with the client (e.g., keyloggers) is Ledger Nano [49] – it
does not have a display, hence the user cannot verify the
details of transactions being signed. An air-gapped transfer
of transactions using QR codes is provided by ELLIPAL
wallet [35]. In ELLIPAL, both the client (e.g., smartphone
App) and the hardware wallet must be equipped with cameras
and display. (1 + 0)-factor authentication is provided by a
credit-card-shaped hardware wallet from CoolBitX [27]. A
hybrid approach that relies on a server providing a relay for
2FA is offered by BitBox [71]. Although a BitBox device
does not have a display, after connecting to a machine, it
communicates with the client running on the machine and
12
at the same time, it communicates with a smartphone App
through BitBox’s sever; each requested transaction is displayed
and confirmed by the user on the smartphone. One limitation
of this solution is the lack of self-sovereignty.
Split Control – Threshold Cryptography. In threshold cryp-
tography [70], [53], [37], [11], a key is split into several parties
which enables the spending of crypto-tokens only when n-of-
m parties collaborate. Wallets based on threshold cryptography
provide
(
1(W1,...,Wn) + (X1,...,Xn)
)
-factor authentication, as
only a single signature verification is made on a blockchain, but
n verifications are made by parties that compute a signature.
Therefore, all the computations for co-signing a transaction
are performed off-chain, which provides anonymity of access
control policies (i.e., a transaction has a single signature) in
contrast to the multi-signature scheme that is publicly visible
on the blockchain. An example of this category is presented
by Goldfeder et al. [39]. One limitation of this solution is
a computational overhead that is directly proportional to the
number of involved parties m (e.g., for m = 2 it takes 13.26s).
Another example of this category is a USB dongle called
Mycelium Entropy [61], which, when connected to a printer,
generates triplets of paper wallets using 2-of-3 Shamir’s secret
sharing; providing (1(2) + (0, 0))-factor authentication.
Split Control – Multi-Signature Wallets. In the case of
multi-signature wallets, n-of-m owners of the wallet must
co-sign the transaction made from the multi-owned address.
Thus, the wallets of this category provide (n+X1/.../Xn)-
factor authentication. One example of a multi-owned address
approach is Bitcoin’s Pay to Script Hash (P2SH).21 Examples
supporting multi-owned addresses are Lockboxes of Armory
Secure Wallet [4] and Electrum Wallet [34]. A property of
multi-owned addresses is that each transaction with such an
address requires off-chain communication. A hybrid instance
of this category and client-side hosted wallets category is
Trusted Coin’s cosigning service [74], which provides a 2-
of-3 multi-signature scheme – the user owns a primary and
a backup key, while TrustedCoin owns the third key. Each
transaction is signed first by user’s primary key and then, based
on the correctness of the OTP from Google Authenticator, by
TrustedCoin’s key. Another hybrid instance of this category
and client-side hosted wallets is Copay Wallet [28]. With
Copay, a user can create a multi-owned Copay wallet, where
the user has all keys in his machines and each transaction is
co-signed by n-of-m keys. Transactions are resent across user’s
machines during multi-signing through Copay.
Split-Control – State-Aware Smart Contracts. State-aware
smart contracts provide “rules” for how crypto-tokens of a
contract can be spent by owners, while they keep the current
setting of the rules at the blockchain. The most common
example of state-aware smart contracts is the 2-of-3 multi-
signature scheme that provides (2 +X1/X2)-factor authenti-
cation. An example of the 2-of-3 multi-signature approach that
supports only Trezor hardware wallets is TrezorMultisig2of3
from Unchained Capital [75]. One disadvantage of this solution
is that the user has to own three Trezor devices, which may be
an expensive solution that, moreover, relies only on a single
21We refer to the term multi-owned address of P2SH for clarity, although
it can be viewed as Turing-incomplete smart contract.
vendor. Another example of this category, but using the n-
of-m multi-signature scheme, is Parity Wallet [72]. However,
two recent critical bugs [65], [64] have caused the multi-
signature scheme to be currently disabled. The n-of-m multi-
signature scheme is also used in Ethereum MultiSigWallet from
ConsenSys [25].
Hosted Wallets. Common features of hosted wallets are
that they provide an online interface for interaction with the
blockchain, managing crypto-tokens, and viewing transaction
history, while they also store private keys at the server side.
If a hosted wallet has full control over private keys, it is
referred to as a server-side wallet. A server-side wallet acts
like a bank – the trust is centralized. Due to several cases of
compromising such server-side wallets [77], [67], [68], [58],
the hosted wallets that provide only an interface for interaction
with the blockchain (or store only user-encrypted private keys)
have started to proliferate. In such wallets, the functionality,
including the storage of private keys, has moved to the user’s
browser (i.e., client). We refer to these kinds of wallets as
client-side wallets (a.k.a., hybrid wallets [36]).
Server-Side Wallets. Coinbase [23] is an example of a server-
side hosted wallet, which also provides exchange services.
Whenever a user logs in or performs an operation, he authenti-
cates himself against Coinbase’s server using a password and
obtains a code from Google Authenticator/Authy app/SMS.
Other examples of server-side wallets having equivalent se-
curity level to Coinbase are Circle Pay Wallet [21] and Luno
Wallet [52]. The wallets in this category provide (0 + 2)-factor
authentication when 2FA is enabled.
Client-Side Wallets. An example of a client-side hosted wallet
is Blockchain Wallet [12]. Blockchain Wallet is a password-
derived wallet that provides 1-factor authentication against the
server based on the knowledge of a password and additionally
enables 2FA against the server through one of the options
consisting of Google Authenticator, YubiKey, SMS, and email.
When creating a transaction, the user can be authenticated by
entering his secondary password. Equivalent functionality and
security level as in Blockchain Wallet are offered by BTC Wal-
let [15]. In contrast to Blockchain Wallet, BTC wallet uses 2FA
also during the confirmation of a transaction. Other examples
of this category are password-derived wallets, like Mycelium
Wallet [51], CarbonWallet [18], Citowise Wallet [22], Coinomi
Wallet [24], and Infinito Wallet [43], which, in contrast to the
previous examples, do not store backups of encrypted keys at
the server. A 2FA feature is provided additionally to password-
based authentication, in the case of CarbonWallet. In detail, the
2-of-2 multi-signature scheme uses the machine’s browser and
the smartphone’s browser (or the app) to co-sign transactions.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed SmartOTPs, a smart-
contract wallet framework that provides a secure and usable
method of managing crypto-tokens. The framework provides
2-factor authentication that is executed in two stages of in-
teraction with the blockchain and protects against an attacker
possessing a user’s private key or a user’s authenticator or an
attacker that tampers with the client. Our framework uses OTPs
realized by a pseudo-random function, Merkle trees, and hash
chains. We combine these primitives in a novel way, which
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provides usability in an air-gapped setting using transcription
of mnemonic words. The protocol of our framework is general
and can be utilized, beside the wallets, in any smart contract
application for the purpose of 2-factor authentication. In future
work, we plan to investigate 2-factor authentication schemes
in the context of emerging privacy-preserving smart contract
platforms [46], [19].
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APPENDIX
A. Notation
In the appendix, we use the following notation in addition
to the notation used so far: function LSB(.) extracts a value
of the least significant bit (LSB); a b represents the bitwise
left shift of argument a by b bits; a | b represents bitwise
OR of arguments a and b; a & b represents bitwise AND of
arguments a and b; and a ⊕ b represents bitwise exclusive
OR of arguments a and b.
B. Details of Algorithms and Implementation
When bootstrapping C, OTPs of the last iteration layer
of hash chains are generated by Algorithm 4 using current
parent tree index η and secret seed k. Generated OTPs are then
processed by hash chains, obtaining the first iteration layer of
OTPs; this layer is further aggregated into the root hash by
Algorithm 5, which contains recursive in-situ implementation.
When the OTPopID is used for the authentication of the
operation OopID, the root hash is reconstructed from the OTP
and its proof piopID – first, by resolving hash chains and then
the proof piopID (see Algorithm 6). We present the details of
programming languages and technology used in Table I.
Algorithm 4: Generation of OTPs of the last it. layer
function generateOTPs(k, N, η)
LL OTPs ← [];
for {i ∈ [0, ..., N
P
− 1]} do
LL OTPs.append(Fk(η ∗ NP + i));
return LL OTPs;
Algorithm 5: Aggregation of OTPs
function aggregateOTPs(OTPs)
hOTPs ← [];
for {i ∈ [0, ..., OTPs.len− 1]} do
hOTPs[i] ← hP (OTPs[i]); . Leaves of parent tree
return reduceMT(hOTPs, hOTPs.len);
function reduceMT (hashes, length)
if 1 = length then
return hashes[0];
for {i← 0; i ≤ length/2; i++} do
hashes[i] ← h(hashes[2i] ‖ hashes[2i + 1]);
return reduceMT(hashes, length / 2);
C. Functionality Extension of the Wallet
To give users more flexibility and security in managing
their crypto-tokens, we extended the operation set of Smar-
tOTPs by supporting daily spending limits and last resort
information.
Daily Limit. Adjusting a daily spending limit is a functionality
that contributes primarily to the user’s self-monitoring of
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Algorithm 6: A reconstruction of the root hash from
OTP and its proof
function deriveRootHash(otp, pi, opID)
assert pi.len = H; . H = log2
(
N
P
)
assert opID %
(
N
P
)
= deriveIdx(pi);
res ← hb(opID % N)∗P/Nc(otp); . Resolve hash chain
. Then resolve pi
for {i← 0; i < pi.len; i++} do
if 1 = LSB(pi[i]) then
res ← h(res ‖ pi[i]); . A node of pi[i] is on the right
else
res ← h(pi[i] ‖ res); . A node of pi[i] is on the left
return res;
function deriveIdx(pi)
idx ← 0;
for {i← 0; i < pi.len; i++} do
if 1 = LSB(pi[i]) then
idx ← idx | (1  i);
return idx;
Algorithm 7: A reconstruction of a node in a cached
sublayer of a subtree from OTP and its proof
function deriveNodeInCache(otp, pi, opID)
assert pi.len = HS −LS ; . HS = log2
(
NS
P
)
eci ← getExpectedIdxInCache
(
opID %
(
NS
P
))
;
assert eci = deriveIdxInCache(pi);
res ← hb(opID % N)∗P/NSc(otp); . Resolve hash chain
. Then resolve pi
for {i← 0; i < pi.len; i++} do
if 1 = LSB(pi[i]) then
res ← h(res ‖ pi[i]); . A node of pi[i] is on the right
else
res ← h(pi[i] ‖ res); . A node of pi[i] is on the left
return res;
function deriveIdxInCache(pi)
idx ← 0;
for {i← 0; i < HS −LS ; i++} do
if 1 = LSB(pi[i]) then
idx ← idx | (1  i);
return idx;
function getExpectedIdxInCache(childLeafID)
mask ← 0xFFFFFFFF ≡ 232− 1; . Assuming max. HS = 32
retID ← childLeafID;
for {i← HS −LS ; i < HS ; i++} do
bitToClear ← 0x01  i;
retID ← retID & (mask ⊕ bitToClear);
return retID;
expenses, but at the same time, it avoids typos in transfers
that exceeds a daily limit and are irreversible. This operation
has the only argument representing an amount that can be
spent in a single calendar day. Security implications for this
operation are the same as in the case of the transfer crypto-
tokens operation (see Section VI).
Last Resort Address and Timeout. As users may lose their
secrets, leading to an unrecoverable state, we propose an
extension that deals with such a situation based on the last
resort address and timeout options. This sort of a functionality
needs two dedicated operations of our protocol, one for the
adjustment of the last resort address and another one for the
adjustment of the timeout. If the timeout has elapsed, then
Component Language Techonology LoC
Smart Contract Solidity, Javascript Truffle 647
Decentralized Client Javascript, HTML, JSON DAPP, jQuery 1939
Authenticator Java Android 1564
Tests Javascript Truffle 1166
Sum 5316
TABLE I: Development effort in Lines of Code (LoC).
Operation Stage Mean
[gas]
Standard
Deviation
[gas]
Sum
[gas]
Transfer Init. 70,558 0 139,098Confirm. 68,540 129
Set Daily Limit Init. 69,342 0 133,938Confirm. 64,596 129
Set Last Resort
Timeout
Init. 69,342 0 134,324Confirm. 64,982 474
Set Last Resort
Address
Init. 70,366 0 135,604Confirm. 65,238 129
Introduction
of the Next
Parent Tree
Stage 1 34,223 -
1,165,691Stage 2 49,459 -
Stage 3 1,082,009 -
Introduction of
the Next Subtree Depends mainly on LS (see Figure 6)
Send Crypto-Tokens to
the Last Resort Address - 13,887 - 13,887
TABLE II: Costs of all operations (H = 10, LS = 7, P = 1).
anyone may call a dedicated function that transfers all the
crypto-tokens of the wallet to the last resort address and
destroys the contract. Note that the last resort address is
enforced to be different than the address of the owner of the
smart contract in order to avoid transferring all funds of the
wallet to the owner’s address (i.e., that might be under control
of the adversary) when the user loses all secrets. Also note
that refreshment of the most recent activity is made only in
the second stage of our protocol, requiring an OTP.
D. Cost of All Operations
Operational costs of all implemented operations are shown
in Table II. In the table, we do not account for deployment
costs, and hence we measure only instant gas consumption
of the function calls. Note that the first execution of an
operation may be more expensive in contrast to the next
ones due to an initialization of some variables (i.e., +15k or
+30k of gas depending on the operation). Thus, we measured
the gas consumption of the second and later executions of
each type of operation. The cost measurements were obtained
using configuration with the optimal cost (i.e., LS = HS − 3),
H = HS and P = 1, and they are independent of H .
E. Detailed Description of Protocols
Bootstrapping – protocol ΠSB
(for a secure environment)
• Authenticator A: Generate k ← random() and
display k to U.
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• Client C: Upon k, N , NS , and P are entered
by U into C, compute OTPsLL ← Fk(η ∗ NP + i), i ∈
{0,...,NP − 1}, η ∈ {0,1,...}. Then compute and store
hOTPs← hP (OTPsLL[i]), i ∈ {0,...,NP − 1} (leaves
of the parent tree). Then delete OTPsLL and k.
Then compute root← reduceMT (hOTPs) by Algo-
rithm 5, the cached sublayer cache of the first sub-
tree and the proof picr of that subtree’s root hash
against the parent root hash rootHash. Then create
txconstructor(root, cache, picr) and send it to W.
Upon receiving {txconstructor(root, cache, picr, PKU)}
from W, forward it to S. Upon receiving the event
ContrDeployed(SID) from S, update UI and inform U
about the deployment and display SID.
• User U: Upon k is generated by A, transfer k from
A to C in an air-gapped manner. Upon C displays SID,
record SID as a public reference serving for transfers of
crypto-tokens to S.
• Private Key Wallet W: Generate private/public
key-pair SKU, PKU ← Σ.KeyGen(). Upon receiving
txconstructor(root, cache) from C, add PKU to this
transaction and send it to C.
• Smart Contract S: Upon receiving {txconstructor
(root, cache, picr, PKU)} from C, deploy the code
of S (i.e., Algorithm 1 enriched by storing/handling
of cache) on the blockchain, assigning SID to S.
During the deployment, store root, PKU, cache (as
currentSubLayer), and adjust nextOpID ← 0. Also,
compute the root hash from currentSubLayer and verify
its consistency against rootHash using picr. Finally, send
event ContrDeployed(SID) to C.
Bootstrapping – protocol ΠIB
(for an insecure environment)
• Authenticator A: Generate k ← random().
Upon U enters N , NS , and P to A, compute
OTPsLL ← Fk(η ∗ NP + i), i ∈ {0,...,NP − 1}. Then
compute hOTPs← hP (OTPsLL[i]), i ∈ {0,...,NP − 1}
(leaves of the tree) and export them to microSD
card. Then compute root← reduceMT (hOTPs) by
Algorithm 5 and display it to U.
• Client C: Upon leaves of the tree hOTPs are
delivered by U to C, store hOTPs in the local storage.
Then compute root← reduceMT (hOTPs) by Algo-
rithm 5, the cached sublayer cache of the first sub-
tree and the proof picr of that subtree’s root hash
against the parent root hash rootHash. Then create
txconstructor(root, cache, picr) and send it to W.
Upon receiving {txconstructor(root, cache, picr, PKU)}
from W, forward it to S. Upon receiving event
ContrDeployed(SID) from S, update UI and inform U
about the deployment.
• User U: Enter N , NS , and P to A and C. Upon
hOTPs are exported by A to microSD card, transfer them
to C. Upon root′ of {txconstructor(root′, cache, picr)} is
displayed at W, verify whether root = root′ by reading
displays of W and A. In the positive case, proceed with
the deployment by pressing a hardware button of W. Upon
W displays SID, record SID as a public reference serving
for transfers of crypto-tokens to S.
• Private Key Wallet W: Generate private/public
key-pair SKU, PKU ← Σ.KeyGen(). Upon receiving
txconstructor(root
′, cache, picr) from C, display root′
and SID ← h(PKU ‖ root′) to U. Upon confirmation by
U, add PKU to this transaction and send it to C.
• Smart Contract S: The same as in ΠSB . The only
difference in contrast to ΠSB is the requirement on a de-
terministic computation of SID by a blockchain platform
using both PKU and root. Hence SID can be computed
by W and S independently.
Operation execution – protocol ΠO
• Authenticator A: Upon receiving opID from U,
compute OTPopID ← hα(opID)(Fk(β(opID))), where
α(opID) and β(opID) are computed by Equation 3. Then
display OTPopID to U.
• Client C: Upon args are entered by U into
C, construct txinitOp(args) and send it to W. Upon
receiving {txinitOp(args)}U from W, forward it to
to S. Upon receiving event InitOpEvent(opID)
from S, update UI and inform U about initializa-
tion of OopID. Upon entering OTPopID by U, cre-
ate proof piopID from the local storage. Then create
txconfirmOp(OTPopID,piopID,opID) and send it to S.
Upon receiving event ConfirmOpEvent(opID) from S,
update UI and inform U.
• User U: Enter args of intended operation into
C. Upon args′ of txinitOp(args′) are displayed at W,
verify whether args = args′ by reading display of W
and UI of C. In the positive case confirm signing of
transaction within W by a hardware button. Upon C
informs about initialized OopID, enter opID into A. Upon
A displays OTPopID, transfer OTPopID to C in an air-
gapped manner.
• Private Key Wallet W: Upon receiving
txinitOp(args
′) from C, display args′ to U. Upon
confirmation of args′ by U, sign txinitOp(args′) by
Σ.Sign(tx, SKU) and send it to C.
• Smart Contract S: Upon receiving
{txinitOp(args)}U from C, verify signature tx.σ
by Σ.V erify(tx.σ, PKU). Then create a new
pending operation OopID with opID ← nextOpID
using args and increment nextOpID. Then
send event InitOpEvent(opID) to C. Upon
receiving txconfirmOp(OTPopID,piopID,opID)
from C, verify OopID.pending = true. Then
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verify correctness of OTPopID by checking
currentSubLayer[(opID % (NS / P )) / 2
HS−LS ] =
deriveNodeInCache(OTPopID, piopID, opID) from
Algorithm 7 (or alternatively rootHash = derive-
RootHash(OTPopID, piopID, opID) from Algorithm 6
for the version without subtrees). Then execute OopID
and set OopID.pending ← false. Finally, send event
ConfirmOpEvent(opID) to C.
Introduction of a new parent tree – protocol ΠSNR
(for a secure environment)
• Authenticator A: Upon U enters opID into A,
check whether opID % N = N − 1, and if so, notify U
that a new parent tree is being introduced and display k to
U. Then compute OTPopID ← hα(opID)(Fk(β(opID))).
Next, compute OTPsLL ← Fk(ηNP + i), i ∈
{0,...,NP − 1}, where η ← η+ 1. Then compute
rootnew ← aggregateOTPs(OTPsLL) by Algorithm 5
and hRootAndOTP ← h(rootnew ‖ OTPopID). Finally,
show rootnew and hRootAndOTP to U.
• Client C: [Stage I] C notifies U that a new
parent tree needs to be introduced and displays
opID = N − 1 + ηN , η ∈ {0,1,...}. Upon U enters k
into C, compute OTPN−1 ← hα(opID)(Fk(β(opID))),
where α(opID) and β(opID) are computed
by Equation 3. Then create proof piopID from
the local storage. Then compute OTPsLL ←
Fk(η
N
P + i), i ∈ {0,...,NP − 1}, where η ← η+ 1. Then
compute and store hOTPs← hP (OTPsLL[i]), i ∈
{0,...,NP − 1} (leaves of the new tree). Then
delete OTPsLL and k. Then compute rootnew ←
reduceMT (hOTPs) by Algorithm 5. Then compute
hRootAndOTP ← h(rootnew ‖ OTPopID), construct
tx1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP ), and send it to W.
Upon receiving {tx1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP )}U
from W, forward it to S.
[Stage II] Upon newRootHash1(hRootAndOTP ) event
is received from S, construct tx2 newRootHash(rootnew)
and send it to W. Upon {tx2 newRootHash(rootnew)}U is
received from W, forward it to S.
[Stage III] Upon event newRootHash2(rootnew)
is received from S, compute the cached sublayer
cache of the first subtree in the new parent tree
and the proof picr of the subtree’s root hash against
the parent root hash rootHash. Then construct
tx3 newRootHash(OTPopID, piopID, cache, picr)
and send it to S. Upon receiving event
newRootHash3(OTPopID) from S, update UI and
inform U.
• User U: Upon C displays opID = N − 1 +
ηN , η ∈ {0,1,...} and informs U about necessity
of introducing a new parent tree, enter opID into
A. Upon A displays k, transfer k from A to
C in an air-gapped manner. Upon hRootAndOTP ′
of {tx1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP ′)} is displayed
at W, verify hRootAndOTP ′ = hRootAndOTP by
reading displays of W and A. Upon rootnew′ of
{tx2 newRootHash(rootnew′)} is displayed at W, verify
rootnew
′
= rootnew by reading displays of W and A. In
the positive case, confirm signing of transaction within W
by a hardware button.
• Private Key Wallet W: The same as in ΠO.
• Smart Contract S: [Stage I] Upon receiving
{tx1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP )}U from C,
verify signature tx.σ by Σ.V erify(tx.σ, PKU).
Then verify nextOpID % N = N − 1; if so,
append hRootAndOTP into L1. Then send event
newRootHash1(hRootAndOTP ) to C.
[Stage II] Upon receiving {tx2 newRootHash(rootnew)}U
from C, verify signature tx.σ by Σ.V erify(tx.σ, PKU).
Then verify nextOpID % N = N − 1; if so,
append rootnew into L2. Then send event
newRootHash2(rootnew) to C.
[Stage III] Upon {tx3 newRootHash(OTPopID, piopID, ca-
che,picr)} is received from C, verify nextOpID % N =
N − 1. Then verify correctness of OTPopID by checking
currentSubLayer[(opID % (NS / P )) / 2
HS−LS ] =
deriveNodeInCache(OTPopID, piopID, opID)
from Algorithm 7 (or alternatively rootHash =
deriveRootHash(OTPopID, piopID, opID) from
Algorithm 6 for the version without subtrees). Then
locate the first entries of L1 and L2 that match
the condition h(L2[i] ‖ OTPopID) = L1[j], where
i ∈ {0,...,L2.len}, j ∈ {0,...,L1.len}. If matching
entries are found, then set rootHash← L2[i], increment
nextOpID, adjust currentSubLayer ← cache and
verify its consistency against rootHash by the function
subtreeConsistency(croot, picr, rootHash). Note
that this function requires already computed root
hash of the subtree using Algorithm 5: croot←
reduceMT (currentSubLayer, currentSubLayer.len).
Finally, clear the lists L1,L2 ← [],[].
Introduction of a new parent tree – protocol ΠINR
(for an insecure environment)
• Authenticator A: Upon U enters opID into A,
check whether opID % N = N − 1, and if so display
OTPopID ← hα(opID)(Fk(β(opID))) and notify U that
a new parent tree is being introduced. Then, compute
OTPsLL ← Fk(ηNP + i), i ∈ {0,...,NP − 1}, where η ←
η+ 1. Then compute hOTPs← hP (OTPsLL[i]), i ∈
{0,...,NP − 1} and export it to a microSD card. Finally,
compute rootnew ← reduceMT (hOTPs) by Algo-
rithm 5 and hRootAndOTP ← h(rootnew ‖ OTPopID),
and display both to U.
• Client C: [Stage I] C notifies U that a new parent
tree needs to be introduced and displays opID = N −
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1 + ηN, η ∈ {0,1,...}. Upon entering OTPopID by U,
create proof piopID from the local storage. Upon leaves
of the tree hOTPs are delivered by U into C, store
hOTPs in the local storage. Then compute rootnew ←
reduceMT (hOTPs) by Algorithm 5. Then compute
hRootAndOTP ← h(rootnew ‖ OTPopID), construct
tx1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP ), and send it to W.
Upon receiving {tx1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP )}U
from W, forward it to S. [Stages II] and [Stage III] are
the same as in ΠSNR
• User U: Upon C displays opID = N − 1 +
ηN, η ∈ {0,1,...} and informs U about necessity of
introducing a new parent tree, enter opID into A. Upon A
displays OTPopID and notify U that the new parent tree is
being introduced, transfer OTPopID to C in an air-gapped
manner. Upon hOTPs are exported by A to microSD
card, transfer them to C. Upon hRootAndOTP ′ of
{tx1 newRootHash(hRootAndOTP ′)} is displayed at W,
verify hRootAndOTP ′ = hRootAndOTP by reading
displays of W and A; in the positive case, confirm signing
of transaction within W by a hardware button. Upon
rootnew
′
of {tx2 newRootHash(rootnew′)} is displayed at
W, verify rootnew′ = rootnew by reading displays of W
and A; in the positive case, confirm signing of transaction
within W by a hardware button.
• Private Key Wallet W: The same as in ΠO.
• Smart Contract S: The same as in ΠNRS .
Introduction of the next subtree – protocol ΠST
• Authenticator A: The same as in ΠO.
• Client C: C notifies U that a new
subtree needs to be introduced and displays
opID = (NS − 1) + δNS , δ ∈ {0, ..., NNS − 2}.
Upon entering OTPopID by U, create the proof
piopID from the local storage. Then compute
nextSubLayer (i.e., the cached sublayer of the
next subtree) and picr (i.e., the proof of the next
subtree’s root) from C’s storage. Next construct
txnextSubtree(nextSubLayer, OTPopID, piopID, picr)
and send it to S. Upon receiving event
newSubtree(opID) from S, update UI and inform U.
• User U: Upon C displays opID = (NS − 1) +
δNS , δ ∈ {0, ..., NNS − 2} and informs U about necessity
of introducing the next subtree, enter opID into A. Upon
A displays OTPopID, transfer it to C in an air-gapped
manner.
• Private Key Wallet W: No interaction required.
• Smart Contract S: Upon receiving
txnextSubtree(nextSubLayer, OTPopID, piopID, picr)
from C, verify nextOpID % N 6= N − 1∧
nextOpID % NS = NS − 1∧ currentSubLayer.len =
nextSubLayer.len. Then verify correctness of OTPopID
by checking cache[(opID % (NS / P )) / 2HS−LS ] =
deriveNodeInCache(OTPopID, piopID, opID)
from Algorithm 7. Next, update the current cached
sublayer currentSubLayer ← nextSubLayer and
check its consistency against rootHash by a function
subtreeConsistency(croot, picr, rootHash). Note
that this function requires already computed root
hash of the next subtree using Algorithm 5: croot←
reduceMT (currentSubLayer, currentSubLayer.len)
and its proof picr. Finally, increment nextOpID and
send event newSubtree(opID) to C.
F. Classification and Properties of Wallets
We present a comparison of wallets and approaches from
related work (see Section VIII) in Table III. In the table, we
classify authentication schemes using our proposed classifica-
tion, while we also survey a few selected security and usability
properties of the wallets [36]. In the following, we briefly
describe each property and explain criteria stating how we
attributed the properties to particular wallets.
Air-Gapped Property. We attribute this property (Y) to
approaches that involve at least one hardware device storing
secret information, which do not need a connection to a
machine in order to operate.
Resilience to Tampering with the Client. We attribute this
property (Y) to all hardware wallets that sign transactions
within a device, while they require the user to confirm trans-
action’s details at the device (based on displayed information).
Then, we attribute this property to wallets containing multiple
clients that collaborate in several steps to co-signs transactions
(a chance that all of them are tampered with is small).
Post-Quantum Resilience. We attribute this property (Y) to
approaches that utilize hash-based cryptography that is known
to be resilient against quantum computing attacks [2].
No Need for Off-Chain Communication. We attribute this
property (Y) to approaches that do not require an off-chain
communication/transfer of transaction among parties/devices
to build a final (co-)signed transaction, before submitting it to
a blockchain (applicable only for Z ≥ 2 or Wi ≥ 2).
Malware Resistance (e.g., Key-Loggers). We attribute this
property (Y) to approaches that either enable signing transac-
tions inside of a sealed device or split signing control over
secrets across multiple devices.
Secret(s) Kept Offline. We attribute this property (Y) to
approaches that keep secrets inside their sealed storage, while
they expose only signing functionality. Next, we attribute this
property to paper wallets and fully air-gapped devices.
Independence of Trusted Third Party. We attribute this
property (Y) to approaches that do not require trusted party for
operation, while we do not attribute this property to all client-
side and server-side hosted wallets. We partially (P) attribute
this property to approaches requiring an external relay server
for their operation.
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Resilience to Physical Theft. We attribute this property (Y)
to approaches that are protected by an encryption password
or PIN. We partially (P) attribute this property to approaches
that do not provide password and PIN protection but have a
specific feature to enforce uniqueness of an environment in
which they are used (e.g., bluetooth pairing).
Resilience to Password Loss. We attribute this property (Y)
to approaches that provide means for recovery of secrets (e.g.,
a seed of hierarchical deterministic wallets).
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Comments
Classification Details
Keys in Local Storage 1+ (0) Private key
Bitcoin Core [8] 1+ (0) For one of the options N N N Y N N Y N N/A
MyEtherWallet [62] 1+ (0) For one of the options N N N Y N N Y N N/A
Password-Protected Wallets 1+ (1) Private key + encryption
Armory Secure Wallet [4] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y N
Electrum Wallet [34] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y N
MyEtherWallet (Offline) [62] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y N
Bitcoin Core [8] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y N
Bitcoin Wallet [9] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y N
Password-Derived Wallets 1+ (X1)
Armory Secure Wallet [4] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y Y
Electrum Wallet [34] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y Y
Metamask [56] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N Y Y Y
Daedalus Wallet [30] 1+ (2) 2 passwords N N N Y N N Y Y Y
Hardware Storage Wallets 1+ (X1)
Trezor [73] 1+ (1) N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ledger [50] 1+ (1) N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
KeepKey [45] 1+ (1) N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
BitLox [10] 1+ (2) 2 passwords∗ N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
∗Additionally, protection
against the evil maid attack
CoolWallet S [27] 1+ (0) N Y N Y Y Y Y P† N/A † Depending on the mode
Ledger Nano [49] 1+ (2) Password + GRID card N N N Y N Y Y Y Y
ELLIPAL wallet [35] 1+ (1) Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
BitBox USB Wallet [71] 1+ (2) 1 password and App N Y N Y Y Y P‡ Y Y ‡Requires a relay server
Split Control –
Threshold Cryptography 1
(W1) +(X11 ,...,X
W1
1 )
Goldfeder et al. [39] 1(2) +(1,1) Assuming 2 devices, eachprotected by a password N Y N N Y N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mycelium Entropy [61] 1(2) +(0,0) N Y N N Y Y Y Y N/A
Split Control –
Multi-Signature Wallets Z +(X1/.../Xz)
Lockboxes of Armory
Secure Wallet [4] Z +(X1/.../Xz) Z up to 7, Xi = 1 N Y N N Y N Y Y N
Electrum Wallet [34] Z +(X1/.../Xz) Z up to 15, Xi = 1 N Y N N Y N Y Y Y
Trusted Coin’s
cosigning service [74] 2+ (1/2)
2 private keys + 2 passwords
and Google Auth. N Y N N Y N N Y Y A hybrid client-side wallet
Copay Wallet [28] 2+ (1/1) N Y N N Y N P Y Y A hybrid client-side wallet
Split-Control –
State-Aware Smart Contracts Z +(X1/.../Xz)
TrezorMultisig2of3 [75] 2+ (1/1) Assuming that each deviceis protected by a password N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y
Parity Wallet [72] Z +(X1/.../Xz) Z is unlimited, Xi = 1 N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y
ConsenSys Wallet [26] Z +(X1/.../Xz) Z up to 50, Xi = 1 N Y N Y Y N Y N/A Y
SmartOTPs 2+ (1/1) Private key and OTPs+ passwords Y
◦ Y$ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y#
◦Fully air-gapped, if combined
with ELLIPAL wallet
$Thanks to a hardware wallet
#Also resilient to loss of all secrets
Server-Side Wallets 0+ (X1)
Coinbase [23] 0+ (2) Password, Google Auth./SMS N N N Y N N N Y Y
Circle Pay [21] 0+ (2) —”— N N N Y N N N Y Y
Luno Wallet [52] 0+ (2) Password and Google Auth. N N N Y N N N Y Y
Client-Side Wallets Z +(X1)
Blockchain Wallet [12] 1+ (2) Password and one of: GoogleAuth., YubiKey, SMS, or email N N N Y N N N Y Y
BTC Wallet [15] 1+ (2) —”— N N N Y N N N Y Y
Mycelium Wallet [51] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N N Y Y
CarbonWallet [18] 2+ (2) 2 private keys stored inbrowser and smartphone N Y N N N N N Y Y
Citowise Wallet [22] 1+ (2) N Y¶ N Y N P¶ N Y Y
¶If combined with Trezor
or Ledger
Coinomi Wallet [24] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N N Y Y
Infinito Wallet [43] 1+ (1) N N N Y N N N Y Y
TABLE III: Comparison of state-of-the-art cryptocurrency wallets.
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